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ABSTRACT
Worry and rumination are implicated in various disorders and are believed to contribute to
the symptoms that create and maintain psychopathology. The current critical review will
examine worry and rumination in the context of depression, Generalized Anxiety Disorder
(GAD), Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), and
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD). The review will focus on these two types of repetitive negative
thinking more specifically the (a) definition, (b) process, (c) theories, and (d) maintenance of
psychopathology; as well as similarities and differences between these two processes. A
second emphasis will be on the importance of cultural considerations when treating
individuals with emotional disorders. A third focus of the analysis will be on the rationale,
overview, and literature associated with a transdiagnostic treatment named the Unified
Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders (UP) . Finally, this review
will conclude by highlighting futures research studies that can be implemented to improve upon
the existing UP research.

Keywords: Worry, Rumination, Anxiety, Depression, GAD, PTSD, OCD, SAD, Transdiagnostic,
Culture, Unified protocol for transdiagnostic treatment of emotional disorders.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Repetitive thoughts, defined as “thinking attentively, repetitively, and/or frequently about
oneself and one’s world” (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003, p. 909),
are ubiquitous, inescapable, and play an important function in peoples’ day-to-day lives and
consequently their emotional and physical well-being (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004;
Segerstrom, et al., 2016; Segerstrom, Roach, Evans, Schipper, & Darville, 2010; Watkins, 2008).
Repetitive thoughts and its impact on the individual can be further defined via how they present
along the dimension of valence. Valence is defined as the emotional value associated with a
stimulus, event, object, or situation, i.e., content (Segerstrom et al., 2003). The value can be
intrinsically attractive (positive valence) or aversive (negative valence) (Frijda, 1986). Examples
of positively valenced repetitive thoughts include anticipation and reminiscing while negatively
valenced repetitive thoughts include rumination, worry, and self-criticism (Segerstrom et al.,
2016). The valence of repetitive thoughts is associated with concurrent affect and feelings of
emotional and physical well-being (Segerstrom et al. 2003). More specifically, individuals who
experience repetitive thoughts with less negative content and are more positively valenced are
likely to result in increased self-report of positive affect, less anxiety, better overall mental
health, and fewer negative physical symptoms than individuals reporting repetitive thoughts with
greater negative content (Beck, 1967; Segerstrom et al. 2003; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Moreover,
an increase in negative affect and a decrease in motivation was self-reported by study
participants who experience repetitive negative valenced thoughts (Beck, 1967; Martin, Tesser,
& McIntosh, 1993). This paper will closely examine two specific types of negative valenced
thoughts, worry and rumination; which are thought to be present in a number of psychological
disorders and can greatly impact an individual’s functioning.
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Definition of Rumination
A review of the literature points to the difficulty in characterizing, measuring, and predicting
the complex and multifaceted nature of the construct of rumination. One oft-cited definition was
developed by Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) who deﬁnes rumination as ‘‘behaviors and thoughts that
passively focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of
these symptoms’’ (p. 239). Another commonly found definition by Smith and Alloy (2009)
proposes that rumination is a “stable, negative, broadly construed way of responding to
discrepancies between current status and target status” (p. 126).
Rumination is most often measured in research and clinical practice using the
Ruminative Response Scale (Topper, Emmelkamp, Watkins, & Ehring, 2014). The Ruminative
Response Scale was developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) as a 22-question selfreport Likert-scale questionnaire measuring how often an individual is focused on self, on
symptoms, and on causes and consequences of their moods. A sample of the questionnaire can
be found in Appendix A. Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) further refined the
Ruminative Response Scale by identifying a two-factor model of rumination. After identifying
12 questions within the scale as being depression related, i.e. more likely to be measures of
depression than rumination, the remaining 10 questions were found to describe two aspects of
rumination reflection and brooding. The reflection questions on the measure reflect a looking
inward to purposefully participate in problem-solving while brooding involves passively
comparing one's current situation to an unachieved ideal (Treynor et al., 2003).
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Definition of Worry
Similar to rumination, worry is difficult to conceptualize, define, and assess; and there is a
multitude of descriptions of worry. One common and widely proffered definition is:
A chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively
uncontrollable; it represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on an
issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more
negative outcomes; consequently, worry relates closely to the fear process.
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10)
Another commonly found definition by Mathews (1990) proposes that worry is a cognitive
process that is involved in maintaining feelings of anxiety and hypervigilence of threats or
danger. Almost all definitions share the commonality of identifying worry as future
oriented, and having to do with concerns anticipating and preparing for future threats while
avoiding negative affect and painful images (Dar & Iqbal, 2015; Yang et al., 2014; Watkins,
Moulds, & McIntosh, 2005; McLaughlin, Borkovec & Sibrava, 2007; Borkovec, HazlettStevens, & Diaz, 1999).
The gold standard measure used to assess worry is the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (Topper et al., 2014). The Penn State Worry Questionnaire, a 16-item self-report
measure, was developed by Meyer, Miller, Metzger, and Borkovec (1990) as a trait measure for
worry. The aim of the questionnaire is to assess the pervasiveness, intensity, and
uncontrollability of worry (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). A sample of the questionnaire can be
found in Appendix B.
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Worry, Rumination, and Psychopathology
Regardless of the definitional difficulties with both concepts, most researchers and
clinicians are likely to agree that worry and rumination are two types of repetitive, negative
valenced, thought processes that account for some of the symptoms believed to create and
maintain psychopathology. Worry and rumination are both thought to be unproductive cognitive
thought processes that trigger negative emotions and maintain negative affect (Dar & Iqbal, 2015; de
Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Yook, Kim, Suh, &
Lee, 2010). With regards to the latter, they are thought to be unproductive because they do not lead to
active problem solving or behavioral changes (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).
These two types of negative valenced repetitive thoughts are known in research to be implicated in
many disorders, including unipolar depressive disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD),
and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Kim, Yu, Lee, & Kim, 2012; van Oppen, Hoekstra, &
Emmelkamp, 1995), social anxiety disorder (SAD), and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
indicating that rumination and worry are transdiagnostic (Abbot & Rapee, 2004; Ehlers, Mayou,
& Bryant, 1998).

5

In addition, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)
implicates some of the processes of worry, rumination or both as diagnostic criteria in three
disorders OCD, GAD, and PTSD, as illustrated in the table below.
Table 1
Worry and Rumination in OCD, GAD and PTSD
Disorder

Thought Disturbance

Obsessive Compulsive Disorder - 300.3

Recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges, or
images that are experienced at some time
during the disturbance, as intrusive and
unwanted, and that in most individuals
cause marked anxiety or distress. (In order
to relieve distress from intrusive and
repetitive worries, individuals engage in
compulsions. Rumination is a common type
of compulsion (McKay et. al, 2004)).

Generalized Anxiety Disorder - 300.02

Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive
expectation), occurring more days than not
for at least 6 months, about a number of
events or activities (such as work or school
performance).

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder - 309.81

Persistent, distorted cognitions about the cause
and or consequences of the traumatic event(s)
that lead the individual to blame
himself/herself or others. (The persistent and
distorted cognitions manifest as rumination
and worry (Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann,
Ruths, & Clark, 2007)).

Even though the DSM-5 does not specifically mention worry or rumination as part of the
diagnostic criteria for unipolar depression, and SAD, research points to the role these repetitive
thoughts play in exacerbating symptomology associated with the disorders. For example, worry
and rumination are consistently assessed and endorsed in self-report measures (e.g. The
Ruminative Response Scale, Responses to Stress Questionnaire, Impact of Events Scale, The
Penn State Worry Questionnaire, The Worry Domains Questionnaire, and The Student Worry
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Scale) of individuals diagnosed with two of the most common mental health disorders, Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD) and GAD, which have 12-month prevalence rates of 7% and 3.1%
respectively (NIMH, 2015). In addition, these symptoms appear to contribute to the severity or
chronicity of MDD, GAD, PTSD, OCD and SAD by exacerbating negative thinking,
contributing to poor problem solving, depleting motivation to engage in goal-directed behavior,
and reducing social support (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), underscoring the importance of
addressing them in therapeutic interventions (Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher, Blais, 1995;
McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013; Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2007; Watkins
et al., 2005). Given their importance in the potential causal pathway, maintenance, and
exacerbation of clinical symptoms; it will be important to examine rumination and worry more
closely in the next chapters and how they are each thought to be implicated in specific
diagnosable disorders.
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Chapter II: Rumination
Function of Rumination
There is a dearth of research on the function of rumination and theorists differ regarding
rumination’s function. Some theorists suggest that rumination functions as a maladaptive
emotion regulation strategy (Smith & Alloy, 2009; Segerstrom, Roach, Ivans, Schipper, &
Darville, 2010; Verduyn & Lavrijsen, 2015; Yook et al., 2010). More specifically, individuals
believe that engaging in ruminative thinking will result in a decrease in their negative emotional
states.
Other theorists posit that rumination is a control strategy. In an attempt to exert control
over current life circumstances and create a sense of certainty, individuals may be prone to
ruminate over a multitude of questions (Nolen-Hoesksema, 2000) such as “why did my life
turnout this way?”; “Why have I not achieved my goals?” ; and “Why do I feel sad?” In search
of the perfect answer to life questions or the need for excessive certainty of outcomes, ruminators
experience difficulty settling on an answer and committing to a course of action. The inability to
find answers or choose a course of action results in the continued search for answers through
rumination which self-perpetuates the act of rumination. The uncertainty generated by
continuous questioning without finding a solution may, in turn, increase the levels of anxiety
(Nolen-Hoesksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008).
A subset of researchers further propose that individuals who engage in rumination hold
the positive belief that rumination will help them achieve their goals (Martin et al., 2004,
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b; Watkins & Moulds, 2005).
Therefore, individuals who ruminate are convinced that there are benefits to rumination and
therefore continue to engage in this misshapen problem solving strategy. Notably, when
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individuals in a dysphoric mood repetitively think about the causes of a personal problem, selfreflect about a situation, or simply try to understand the consequences of their behavior, they
erroneously believe they are engaging in a thinking process that helps them to reduce the
discrepancies between their current situation and desired outcome, and effectively process
information related to stress and trauma (Smith & Alloy, 2009; Wells, 2008; Wells & Matthews,
1994). In reality, rumination is often thought to increase the number of repetitive thoughts an
individual has and consequently leads to prolonged, negative affective states (Mor & Winquist,
2002; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) and therefore likely to exacerbate or add to any pre-existing
problems the individual was trying to solve in the first place.
Although there is a lack of consensus about the exact function of rumination, whether it is
primarily focused on negative affect reduction, a means of asserting control, or as a way to solve
problems; rumination appears to play a significant role in creating, maintaining, or exacerbating
unpleasant symptoms that may at some point rise to the level of a clinical disorder necessitating
intervention.
Rumination in the Context of Disorders
Rumination is associated with a number of psychological disorders, including depression,
GAD, PTSD, OCD, and SAD. The characteristics of the ruminative process within these
disorders is similar; specifically, repetitive, obsessive, and partially involuntary (Ehring &
Watkins, 2008; Harvey et al., 2004); in that the ruminative thoughts is often described regardless
of the specific disorder to “…recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands
requiring the thoughts’’ (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p.7). Literature has shown interesting links
between rumination and symptoms specifically associated with the diagnoses and presentation of
different disorders; and some of these findings are discussed below.
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Rumination and depression. Research indicates a strong correlation between rumination
and depression. Studies have shown that individuals diagnosed with depression score higher on
a measure of rumination than their non-depressed counterparts (Kimer al., 2012), and higher
levels of rumination impact the onset, severity, and duration of depression (Just & Alloy, 1997;
Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Fredrickson,
1993; Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schouten, 2009). Specifically, the likelihood
of developing clinical depression is higher in individuals whose response to dysphoric moods is
to ruminate (Rood et al., 2009). Additionally, these individuals who responded to their
depressed mood with rumination not only prolonged the duration of their depressive episode, but
also intensified other negative feelings associated with the episode, including generation of and
maintenance of hopelessness and worthlessness (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et
al., 1993). Conversely, depressed individuals who distracted themselves from their dysphoric
moods by focusing on work and interacting with other people, which have the effect of also
distracting these individuals from excessive rumination, experienced a less severe and shorter
depressive episode and experienced less intense negative feelings (e.g., hopelessness,
worthlessness) (Just & Alloy, 1997 Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). The
findings seem to suggest that increased rumination leads to a prolonged and more severe
depressive episode; while actions that inadvertently decrease rumination seem to lead to a more
positive prognosis for depressed individuals.
When reflecting on the literature, it seems possible that rumination often contributes to
depressive symptomology and worsening depression over time because it leads to a recollection
of negative memories from the past, negative interpretations of the present, and a more
pessimistic outlook of the future (Koster, Lissnyder, Derakstan, & Raedt, 2011, Lyubomirsky,
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993,1995; Nolen-
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Hoeksema et al., 2008; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987; Watkins 2008). In this way, it
seems to be an important mechanism in maintaining the negative triad as described by Beck;
specifically, that negative thoughts about the self, others, and the world seem to create and
maintain depressive symptomatology (Beck, 1979). Furthermore, rumination is ineffective as it
rarely leads to a solution and therefore may lead to even more self-deprecating thoughts,
decreased perception of self-efficacy and therefore increased hopelessness, and subsequently
contribute to loss of interest and pleasure in most activities. Moreover, the negative outlook on
the present time that is likely caused by excessive rumination can lead to social avoidance and
isolation, a hallmark symptom of individuals diagnosed with depression, and factors that seem to
contribute to the negative cycle of worsening depression symptoms. Essentially, individuals
with a negative outlook view both potentially beneficial solitary activities (e.g., running) and
collective activities (e.g. going to a restaurant with friends) as distressing, uninteresting, or even
pointless. Rumination may, therefore, directly contribute to the social avoidance behavior that
maintains and worsens depressive symptoms in many individuals (Brockmeyer, Kulessa,
Hautzinger, Bents & Backenstrass, 2015; Goldiamond & Dyrud, 1968). Although avoidance of
potentially beneficial activities may provide short-term relief from distress, this type of
withdrawal behavior leads to isolation and a lack of positive reinforcement from the environment
in the long-term (Brockmeyer, et al., 2015; Jacobson, Martell & Dmidjian, 2001; Martell, Addis
& Jacobson, 2001). In addition, the avoidance behavior is negatively reinforced as a person with
depression may continue to avoid uncomfortable situations because they learn that they not only
obtain temporarily relief from not engaging in a potentially stress inducing activity; but that they
have a mental activity (i.e. rumination) to keep their minds occupied instead. Over time, the
behavior of rumination may become habitual, stable, and ingrained, sometimes persisting even
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after a remission in major depressive symptomology (Hong, 2006; Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, &
McBride, 2004), which then present as a significant risk factor for future depressive episodes.
Given that empirical research suggests that rumination increases the intensity and
duration of depression and therefore may prolong suffering in afflicted individuals, it is
interesting to investigate the reasons for why individuals continue to engage in such maladaptive
thought processes. Fascinatingly, multiple studies on rumination suggest that depressed
individuals endorse very positive beliefs about their practice of ruminating, significantly more
than their never-depressed counterparts (Lyubomisky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou
& Wells, 1999; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). For instance, individuals who ruminate about their
mood (e.g., “Why am I sad?” “What did I do wrong?” “Will I always be this way?”) inaccurately
believed they were enhancing their self-understanding or insight of their negative emotional state
(Lyubomisky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Researchers also found that people with depression
believed rumination increased their self-awareness and their understanding of clinical depression
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2009; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). Ironically, and as discussed in the
earlier section, those who ruminate most often believe they are engaging in a formidable process
of problem solving, when in actuality the processes are playing a significant role in maintaining
their depressive symptoms and potentially leading to further problems in the social, occupational,
or other important domains of functioning. It appears that the belief that rumination is a positive
strategy, adopted by more depressed than non-depressed individuals, is an important explanation
for why depressed individuals continue to engage in this process even though through the eyes of
a professional or loved one it is contributing to a worse prognosis.
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In addition to the strong association between rumination with depressive
symptomatology, the literature also implicates rumination in anxiety disorders. The subsequent
section will discuss the implications of how rumination presents in GAD, PTSD, OCD, and
SAD.
Rumination and generalized anxiety disorder. Few researchers have specifically
studied rumination as expressed in individuals with GAD. However, similar to individuals with
depression, individuals with high levels of anxiety, one of the central criteria of GAD, were also
found to score highly on measures of rumination (Legerstee, Garnesfski, Verhulst, & Utens,
2011). Some of the existing research findings posit that individuals diagnosed with GAD
ruminated more frequently, as measured by the Ruminative Response Scale, than their nonanxious counterparts (Decker, Turk, Hess, & Murray, 2008; Kim et al., 2012). More
specifically, researchers found two subcomponents of rumination, brooding and reflection
(Treynor et al., 2003; Watkins, 2009). The studies showed that the brooding component of
rumination, defined as passively comparing one's current situation to an unachieved ideal, was
directly related to GAD while the reflection component of rumination, looking inward to
purposefully participate in problem-solving, was not. Adding to the importance of examining
the subcomponents of rumination, research suggests that individuals diagnosed with GAD who
were more likely to engage in the subcomponent process of brooding were found to have
increased levels of anxiety in comparison to individuals with GAD who did not often engage in
brooding (Starr & Davila, 2012). With respect to GAD, it appears that the subcomponent process
of brooding appears to be especially closely related to the development and maintenance of
GAD.
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Rumination and posttraumatic stress disorder. Many researchers suggest that
rumination is a predictor of persistent PTSD, and that specifically rumination about the traumatic
event or events is the key process that maintains PTSD symptomology (Clohessy and Ehlers,
1999; Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002; Steil and Ehlers, 2000).
Specifically, rumination that focuses attention on the causes and consequences of the traumatic
event (both aspects that are largely uncontrollable, or at least perceived as such by the victim of
trauma) instead of the actual events associated with the trauma (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers &
Steil, 1995) seem to interferes with effective and therapeutic emotional processing of the event
(Foa & Kozak, 1986) leading to the maintenance of PTSD symptomology. Instead of focusing
attention on the actual, more objective events of the traumatic experience, individuals clinically
diagnosed with PTSD ruminate on the “whys” and “what ifs,” potentially (as posited by some
researchers) as a strategy to avoid experiencing the emotions associated with the trauma
(Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2007). With regards to this hypothesis, rumination may
allow the individual to avoid internal stimuli such as negative feelings and traumatic memories
and external stimuli generated by the environment that might remind the individual of the
traumatic event or events. A consequence of avoiding external stimuli is that the individual is
likely to avoid social interaction entirely, even those that might net positive effects on the
individual’s mood or outlook. Specifically, investigators posit that successful emotional
processing and change occur when the original trauma-related emotions are activated within new
environments or experiences (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Teasdale 1999) that are potentially rewarding
and not traumatic. In contrast, dwelling on the causes of the trauma via ruminative thoughts
instead of proactively engaging with the environment is likely to maintain PTSD
symptomatology and specifically drive the belief that the world is not a safe place.
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In summary, similar to the avoidance function rumination plays in depression, rumination
within the context of individuals with PTSD symptoms seem to serves as an avoidance strategy
of the more effective processing of traumatic memories (Ehlers et al., 1998; Michael et al., 2007)
which would hasten their recovery from PTSD. Even though avoidance provides temporary
relief, in the long term avoidance leads to re-experiencing of the trauma and increased negative
mood states (Ehlers et al., 1998; Michael et al., 2007). The negative emotions triggered by
rumination increase intrusive traumatic memories leading to a ruminative cycle (Michael et al.
2007) possibly even leading to the development or the exacerbation of any comorbid diagnoses.
Rumination and obsessive compulsive disorder. In addition to depression, GAD, and
PTSD, rumination is implicated in OCD and is positively correlated with obsessive-compulsive
symptoms (Wahl, Ertle, Bohne, Zurowski, & Kordon, 2011). Rumination as it affects
individuals with OCD is generally referred to as a ruminative thinking style and is defined as ‘‘a
mode of responding to distress that involves repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of
distress and the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms’’ (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008,
p. 400). The passive focus refers to individuals with OCD who are ruminating having a
propensity to fixate on the problems and on their feelings about the problems without mobilizing
to action (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008). Wells (2009) proposed a metacognitive model of OCD,
postulating that a ruminative thinking style is in part responsible for the maintenance of the
disorder. Specifically as rumination relates to individuals with OCD symptoms, the mental ritual
appears to combine review and checking by first mentally replaying an event that did take place,
and then adding a hypothetical element of the event that could have but did not take place.
Individuals engaging in this repetitive thought process of rumination would then proceed to
analyze how they would have behaved if the hypothetical feared scenario did take place. The
ritual of analyzing a feared hypothetical situation and determining how one would appropriately
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respond in the situation gives the individual a sense of hope that they can manage the situation
(Herschfield, 2013) if it were to ever come to fruition. Extant research establishes a clear link
between rumination and OCD. Wahl et al. (2011) found correlations between depressive
ruminative thinking, obsessive rumination (defined as a ‘‘ voluntary, effortful cognitive or
behavioral act’’ (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997, p. 344)), and obsessive-compulsive (OC)
symptom severity. The results indicated that higher levels of ruminative thinking to distressing
situations resulted in greater obsessive ruminations and subsequently greater obsessivecompulsive symptom severity.
Similar to rumination’s role in other anxiety disorders discussed so far, rumination may
initially reduce feelings of anxiety while in the long run increase symptoms through negative
reinforcement (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997; Freeston et al., 1995; Wahl et al., 2011).
Rumination appears to exacerbate and maintain OCD symptomology since it functions as an
obstacle to decision-making, and indecision is specifically implicated in the pathological
symptomology of OCD. People make countless decisions on any given day; some decisions are
automatic, and others require thought and analysis. An important goal regarding decision making
is to try to maximize positive outcomes as much as possible and to do so expediently, therefore
reducing cognitive load; as indecisiveness is an uncomfortable state for human beings and
contribute to decision fatigue which leads to a number of deleterious effects including negative
impact on emotional states, heightened impulsivity, and ultimately, poorer overall efficiency and
effectiveness in the work environment and other important life domains (Polman & Vohs, 2016;
Vohs et al., 2008) Compulsive individuals have difficulties making decisions efficiently, and as
such decisions are often delayed or avoided, leading individuals to ruminate instead of engaging
in action (Sachdev & Malhi, 2005), which appear to have the effect of leading to further delay
and avoidance of making decisions and increases emotional distress for the individual.
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Rumination and social anxiety disorder. Although rumination is not explicitly listed as a
criterion of SAD in the DSM-5, research posits that rumination is a factor in the maintenance of
SAD (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Clark & Wells, 1995; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997). According to investigators, individuals diagnosed with SAD ruminate by
reviewing social interactions in great detail and attributing to them a negative valence (Clark &
Wells, 1995; Mellings & Alden, 2000), particularly with regards to their own actions or the
perceptions of their actions by others. More specifically, individuals diagnosed with SAD
engage in a specific subtype of rumination that is largely related to social interactions known as
post-event processing, a “period of reflection on actual or perceived inadequacies, mistakes,
imperfections, and the like. . . and is ruminative in nature” (Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & Flett,
2005, p. 972). Individuals with SAD tend to focus specifically upon negative self-focused
information that maintains preexisting negative cognitive biases about themselves and the world
(Melling & Alden, 2000). Post-event processing leads to strong encoding of their interpretation
of the experience into memory, which results in the individual recalling the experience more
negatively than it actually was (Abbot & Rappee, 2004; Clark & Wells, 1995; Dannahy& Stopa,
2007; Edwards, Rapee & Franklin, 2003; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997)
and has direct consequences on how the individual might approach similar social situations in the
future, likely in self-sabotaging or self-effacing ways that increase the likelihood of eliciting their
feared responses of rejection from others. Specifically, the process of post-event processing
results in anticipatory processing prior to the next social engagement leading an individual to
recall all the negative details of their performance in the previous social engagement and to
attribute the same negative outcomes to the future social event (Mellings & Alden, 2000;
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Rachman, Gruter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000). In summary, post-event processing, a specific
subtype of rumination, are more likely used by individuals with SAD compared to individuals
without SAD, and post-event processing functioned to maintain social anxiety symptoms
(Krocovski, Endler, Rectov, and Flett 2005).
Summary of Rumination in the Context of Disorders
In conclusion, individuals who ruminate appear to primarily use it for one or more of the
following functions: (a) gain a sense of control, (b) regulation of emotions including the
reduction of negative emotions and the avoidance of painful feelings, and (c) achieve goals.
Therefore, individuals who ruminate believe that there is a positive effect of this technique,
leading them to increasingly engage in it, often at their own detriment. It is possible individuals
who tend to ruminate have not made this explicit connection between their tendency to ruminate
and the development, maintenance, and even exacerbation of their emotional symptomatology;
or the connection between rumination and problems functioning effectively in various life
domains.
Worry, a different form of repetitive, negative valenced thought process, will be
described in more detail in the subsequent section. Similar to the examination on Rumination, the
discussion will include a more developed description of the process and its role in various
clinical disorders.
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Chapter III: Worry
Function of Worry
Worry is defined as a verbal and linguistic process that allows individuals to avoid
vivid and painful imagery, thus reducing negative affect and biological responses
(Borkovec, Ray, Stober, 1998). The cognitive aspect of worry increases verbal thought and
decreases imaginal thought (a mode of thinking that consists of images that one can see,
hear or feel in the mind and is the primary trigger for emotional activation; Borkovec & Inz
1990). Worry appears to be elicited by an environmental or imaginal fear stimulus that
triggers mental problem solving to prevent the feared event from occurring and/or to
identify coping strategies for such events (Borkovec et al., 1983; Borkovec & Roemer,
1995). Thus, worrying can be adaptive, helping individuals to anticipate, prepare, and
handle future dangers.
In contrast, worrying is considered maladaptive when there is no actual threat and the
danger is imaginal. Paradoxically, the lack of threat and danger may perpetuate excessive
worrying in some individuals. When the unlikely threat does not manifest, worry is
reinforced by the lack of occurrence of the situation that was perceived to be threatening,
leading to an increase in responding to perceived threats with worry (Borkovec, Alcaine &
Behare, 2004). Individuals describe excessive worrying as intrusive concerns or thoughts
recurring throughout their days (Gladstone & Parker, 2003). Furthermore, worry is
conceptualized to be pathological when it is:
Excessive, out of proportion to the actual problem, pervasive, present most of the time,
focused on several themes or topics (typically those that pertain to ‘‘everyday routine life
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circumstances’’, ‘‘minor matters’’, or both), uncontrollable, and with a tendency to
interfere with functioning and cause high levels of distress and impairment (Starcevic et al.,
2007).
Habitual worrying negatively impacts both physical and mental health (Brosschot,
Verkuil, Thayer, 2016). For example chronic worrying has been associated with a two to seven
time increased risk for cardiovascular disease (Tully, Cosh & Baune, 2013). With regards to
mental health, persistent worrying is a central causal factor in chronic anxiety and the default
response to uncertainty (Brosschot, Gerin, Thayer, 2006). Consistent responding to situations
and events with excessive worry also disrupts an individual’s ability to concentrate and
engage effectively in other behaviors (Matthews, 1990). Lang (1988) found that verbal
presentation of fear material produced less cardiovascular response than imaginal presentation of
the same material. Combining these areas of research suggests that imagery activates somatic
emotional experiencing and the linguistic nature of worry interferes with emotional processing
(Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, Diehl, 1993; Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986) thereby,
increasing worrying through negative reinforcement (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec et al.,
1993; Hoehn-Saric & McLeod, 1990).
In addition to worry’s impact on concentration, worry is implicated in control beliefs and
avoidance of negative affect. Some individuals who excessively worry believe that they
should be able to control events, that the uncertainty associated with the lack of control is
intolerable, and that worry will aid in the effort to help them gain a sense of control (Dugas,
Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994).
Other individuals utilize worry, albeit unconsciously to some degree, in order to avoid
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confronting negative affect and aversive images (Borkovec et al., 2004; Roemer, Salters,
Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005). Therefore, individuals who consistently worry derive some perceived
benefits from this process, which makes it more difficult to distinguish this behavior.
Worry in the Context of Disorders
Worry is implicated in a number of psychological disorders, including depression, GAD,
PTSD, OCD, and SAD.
Worry and depression. Worry in the context of depression is experienced as a
predominance of thoughts and not as images (Molina et al., 1998). Two main occurrences result
when individuals shift from a neutral state to one of pathological worry: a decrease of focus on
the present moment and immediate environment, and an increase in cognitive distortions in the
form of absolute words (e.g., always, never), catastrophic words (e.g., awful, terrible,
horrible…) and the use of rules and commands (e.g., should and have to statements; Ingram &
Kendall, 1987; Molina et al., 1998; Vasey & Borkovec, 1992).
Researchers that have examined the relationship between depression and worry indicate
that excessive worry is highly correlated with depression (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Molina,
Borkovec, Peasley & Person, 1998; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Starcevic, 1995). Individuals
diagnosed with depression were also found to self-endorse high levels of worry on the Penn State
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (McEvoy et al., 2013; Segerstrom et al., 2000). Furthermore, in
self-report measures, individuals diagnosed with depression were found to endorse with high
frequency the use of the word worry in describing their thoughts (Nolen-Hoeksema & Mororw,
1993). Further, individuals who endorse higher levels of worry also experience sadness, fear,
irritability, and poor self-worth (Kalmbach, Pillai, & Ciesla, 2016); which suggests that there is
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at least a correlative relationship amongst these factors, if not a partially causal one from worry
to other symptoms associated with depression.
Worry and generalized anxiety disorder. Worry is thought to be the central defining
feature of GAD (Barlow, Blanchard, Vermilyea, Vermilyea, & DiNardo, 1986; Dar & Iqbal,
2015; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubormiski, 2008; Yang et al., 2014). Worry in GAD is
believed to be a predominance of thought activity, which precludes processing negative
emotions (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behr, 2004; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Newman & Llera,
2011). The existence of increased thought activity which might suggest excessive worry
processes in GAD was supported by electroencephalography data showing increases in left
frontal cortical activation (Borkovec, Ray & Stober, 1998; Carter, Johnson, & Borkovec,
1986; Heller. Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997).
When asked why they worry, individuals diagnosed with GAD indicated that
worrying helps to distract them from emotions (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Freeston et al.,
1994), particularly painful or negative ones. Individuals with GAD seem to dislike the direct
experience of emotions. In several studies, individuals with GAD reported greater
discomfort and fear of the negative consequences of experiencing emotions than did their
non-worrying counterparts (Llera & Newman, 2010; Mennin et al., 2005; Roemer et al.,
2005; Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). Unfortunately, the routine
avoidance of processing negative emotions consequently exacerbates distress as symptoms
may reappear in more severe forms, express themselves in bodily ills and pains, and inhibit
the learning and practice of effective emotional processing skills (Decker, Turk, Hess,
Murray, 2008). Some research also suggests that individuals with GAD have difficulty with
the intolerance of uncertainty; and excessive worrying seems to help patients believe they
are establishing a degree of control over their circumstances. Patients may believe that
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through worrying, they are actively attempting to find a solution and prevent potential
negative outcomes (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur & Freeston, 1998; Mogg et al., 1991;
Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Brokovec, 1990).
Subjects diagnosed with GAD seem to derive some perceived benefits from
excessive worry. For example, individuals with GAD cited (a) motivation to get
responsibilities accomplished, (b) preparation for negative outcomes, (c) avoidance of
potential bad events, (d) help with problem solving, (e) distraction from aversive emotions,
and (f) superstitious positive impact on future events (Davey, Hampton, Farrel & Davidson,
1992). Individuals particularly seem to ascribe to the benefits of motivation, preparation for
the worst outcome, and avoidance of feared events (Brokovec & Roemer, 1995).
Worry and posttraumatic stress disorder. Existing studies have established a link
PTSD symptomology and worry (Roussis & Wells, 2006; Scarpa, Wilson, Wells, Patriquin &
Tanaka; 2009). Given the highly aversive internal experiences associated with PTSD, patients
are likely to engage in emotional avoidance behavior through worry (Tull, Hahn, Evans, SaltersPedneault, & Gratz, 2011). Their motivation to worry appears to be directly related to the
intensity of the aversive internal experiences or emotional dysregulation (Marx & Sloan, 2002;
Mennin et al., 2005; Tull, Gratz, Salters, & Roemer, 2004).
In PTSD patients, worry appears to increase attention to perceived threat (leading to
symptoms such as hypervigilance) while reducing cognitive resources which are needed for
processing traumatic events which may make it more difficult for them to experience symptom
remission over time (Bardeen & Fergus, & Wu, 2013; Newman & Llera, 2011). Increased
attention to perceived threat leads to a vicious cycle as it creates further attentional bias toward
negative stimuli or perceived environmental threats, which lead to even more frequent worrying
(Hirsch et al., 2011). Similar to how worry operates for individuals with GAD, the worry
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process in PTSD is also associated with intolerance of uncertainty (Bardeen et al., 2013).
Further, the purpose of worry in PTSD does not seem focused on reducing negative emotions;
rather, to maintain a constant emotional state even if that state is unpleasant (Bardeen, et al.,
2013). Underlying this particular worry function is the belief by many individuals with PTSD
that they lack the ability to regulate emotions and some studies do show that individuals who
endorsed a high number of PTSD symptoms were less effective at emotion regulation (Tull,
Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer, 2007); therefore, a constant unpleasant emotional state is
preferable to fluctuating emotional states (Newman & Llera, 2011).
Worry and obsessive compulsive disorder. Worry in OCD is viewed as a thought
control strategy (defined as action taken to attempt to rid oneself of distressing thoughts; Clark,
2004) and is heavily implicated in the development and maintenance of OCD symptomology
(Fergus & Wu, 2010; McKay & Greisberg, 2002). In actuality, the frequent use of thought
control strategies greatly impede emotional processing of the thought (Foa & Kozack, 1986) and
bring the thought further into consciousness (Clark, 2004), which can be very distressing for the
individual. In addition, worry was found to interact with co-occurring obsessive beliefs or
obsessions (defined as ego-dystonic persistent thoughts and images (Horwath & Weissman,
2000), which inadvertently leads to greater number, frequency, and severity of thought
intrusions. In addition, similar to worry’s function in GAD and PTSD, both worry and
obsessions occur with greater frequency and are associated with stronger perceptions of
uncontrollability in clinical populations than in nonclinical groups. Both worry and obsessions
are also associated with adverse mood, which is related to attentional biases toward anxietyrelated or depression-related information (van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, Vervaeke, 2001). These
findings suggest that worry and the co-occurrence of obsessions in OCD might perpetuate or
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intensify OCD symptoms and make maladaptive behaviors (such as compulsions) taken as a way
to attempt to alleviate the increased anxiety state more difficult to extinguish.
Worry and social anxiety disorder. Worry has been implicated in the maintenance of
SAD symptomology (Hearn, Donovan, Spence & March, 2017). Individuals with SAD were
found to score higher in intensity and frequency of worry than their nonclinical counterparts,
which may suggest that worry is a maintaining or even causal factor in the disorder (Hearn et al.,
2017; Starcevic et al., 2007). Some theorists believe the function of worry within SAD is
similar to the function of worry in GAD and PTSD in that it allows an individual to avoid
uncomfortable emotions (Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Edwards, Rapee, &
Franklin, 2003; Rachman et al., 2000; Wells & Carter, 2002). The process of avoiding
uncomfortable emotions by worrying is thought to generalize to and exacerbate the avoidance of
a multitude of social interactions and performance situations (Hofmann, 2007). Other theorists
believe that individuals worry as a preparatory mechanism, so that they can rehearse aspects of
the social interaction to increase their feelings preparedness and control (Clark & Wells, 1995;
Kashdan & Roberts, 2007; Klemanski, Curtis, McLaughlin, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2016). However,
in individuals with SAD, this seems to have the opposite function and makes them feel illprepared, ill-at-ease, leading them to avoid the situation completely or to self-sabotage their
“performance” due to their heightened anxiety state.
Summary of Worry in the Context of Disorders
In conclusion, individuals who worry appear to primarily use it for one or more of the
following functions, two of which are similar to the reasons individuals engage in rumination: (a)
gain a sense of control, (b) regulation of emotions including the reduction of negative emotions
and the avoidance of painful feelings, and (c) as a response to heightened intolerance of
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ambiguity. Similar to rumination, individuals who worry believe that there is a positive effect of
this technique, leading them to increasingly engage in it along with other co-occurring behaviors
to mitigate their distress, which makes it difficult for these behaviors to be extinguished
especially with the passage of time (Kircanski et al., 2015). It is possible individuals who tend to
worry are more focused on the perceived benefits of worrying rather than its consequences; and
have adopted this as a consistent coping strategy as a way to temporarily feel better about certain
situations and circumstances. However, over time, individuals who excessively worry tend to
have poorer physical and mental health, and have great difficulty functioning effectively in
various life domains.
The previous discussion appears to shed light on the vast similarities between worry and
rumination in terms of their function and effects across various disorders (Kircanski et al., 2015;
McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013). In fact, an active debate exists regarding whether
rumination and worry are the same or separate processes. Therefore, the theoretical and clinical
delineations of both concepts need more clarification. The nature of worry and rumination
suggests that these processes overlap with and differ from each other in important ways. To
further elucidate these two concepts, a more expansive discussion to enhance understanding of
these concepts follows. First, the primary differences between worry and rumination are
discussed. Second, the similarities between worry and rumination will be reviewed. Third, the
clinical implication of the substantial overlap of rumination and worrisome thoughts will be
described. Finally, the importance of targeting rumination and worry as part of a transdiagnostic
treatment approach are explored.
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Chapter IV: Worry and Rumination
Differences between Worry and Rumination
Historically, the symptom of worry was studied in the context of anxiety disorders and
the symptom of rumination was studied in the context of depressive disorders (Ehring &
Watkins, 2008; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, & Heimberg, 2002). Some research posits that worry
and rumination may retain distinct components, which predict anxious and depressive symptoms
differentially within and across time (Ehring & Watson, 2008; Hong, 2007).
In comparison to rumination, worry emerged as the dominant cognitive vulnerability
factor typically seen in anxiety disorder presentations that predicted increases in symptoms over
time (Hong, 2007). Conversely, rumination uniquely predicted higher disengagement from
problems, which resulted in further exacerbation of depressive mood (Hong, 2007). These results
demonstrated not only the distinct features of worry and rumination on coping behavior, but also
the different coping pathways by which they differentially impact on subsequent symptoms.
Further, worry is believed to be future-focused and more associated with feelings of anxiety
while rumination is thought to be past-oriented and more associated with feelings of depression
(Borkovec et al., 2004; Ehring & Watson, 2008; Fresco et al., 2002; McLaughlin et al., 2007;
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Furthermore, the study participants were able to distinguish worry
and rumination based on the temporal-orientation of the thoughts, past or present, and whether
the focus was internal/on the self or external/on the environment (Kircanski et al., 2015). The
above findings may have led to worry to be named a trademark feature of GAD (GAD;
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and a feature of all anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2008),
while rumination has become prevalently featured as a marker of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema,
2004).
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In summary, worry and rumination are experienced differently by an individual,
specifically with regards to temporal orientation past versus present, with regards to focus
internal versus external, and the impact on coping behavior, perception versus avoidance of
problems. Historically, these two concepts have been studied somewhat separately; however, a
large growing body of literature is beginning to examine these factors as interrelated processes
that present as symptoms across a number of clinical conditions.
Similarities between Worry and Rumination
Worry and rumination have been studied as related and overlapping processes in recent
literature. For example, both worry and rumination are classified in the literature as Repetitive
Negative Thinking (RNT). RNT are unproductive and repetitive thought processes that function
to maintain and increase negative affective states (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Sergestrom et al.,
2000; Watkins, 2008). Moreover, whereas persistent brooding about a problem (rumination) is
traditionally known to be a prominent feature of major depressive disorder (MDD), while worry
is more strongly associated with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), recent research suggests
RNT increases vulnerability to multiple anxiety and depressive disorders and, as a common risk
factor, elevated RNT may account for the high levels of comorbidity observed between
emotional disorders (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013). Interestingly, some research
indicates that both worry and rumination are verbal, linguistic, and associated with an
individual’s positive and negative meta-cognitive beliefs about their function. For example, an
individual may believe the function of a negative or positive thought is essential in order to
achieve a certain goal (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Fresco et al., 2002). Segerstrom et al. (2000)
found that both worry and rumination significantly correlated with a measure of repetitive
thinking, leading them to propose that while thought content and goal orientation could
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discriminate between anxious worry and depressive rumination, thought process might not
discriminate between them. In fact, the literature reveals three shared qualities of the thinking
processes underlying worry and rumination. Firstly, thought processes are considered to be
repetitive; secondly, thought processes are difficult to control; and thirdly, thought processes are
focused on negative content (Borkovec et al., 1983; Kashdan & Roberts, 2007; Michael et al.,
2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Further, it appears that uncontrollable levels of repetitive
negative thinking are present across a large range of clinical disorders and appear to be causally
involved in the maintenance of emotional problems (Borkovec et al., 1983). As direct
comparisons of repetitive negative thinking between different disorders (e.g., GAD–type worry
and depressive rumination) have generally revealed more similarities than differences, it is thus
argued that repetitive negative thinking is characterized by the same process across disorders,
which is applied to a disorder–specific content (Segerstrom et al., 2000). Additionally RNT in
the form of worry and rumination were further found to impact the quality of the daily lives of
individuals prone to these processes. For example, participants in one study experienced both
worry and rumination as highly unpleasant, repetitive, and uncontrollable (Kircanski et al.,
2015). Other examples of RNT as cited by Watkins (2008) include “1) Perseverative cognition,
2) Emotional processing, 3) Cognitive processing, 4) Mental simulation, 5) Rehearsal, 6)
Reflection, and 7) Problem solving” (p.163). Watkins (2008) review of the literature consolidates
the unconstructive consequences of RNT into “(a) Vulnerability to depression, (b) Vulnerability
to anxiety, and (c) Difficulties in physical health.” (p.166). Thus, RNT is known to be a
transdiagnostic process as it is not disorder specific; and furthermore, the extant literature
appears to suggest that the symptoms of worry and rumination greatly overlap in their
presentation, and delineations between the two concepts are not always clear.
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Moving toward a Transdiagnostic Theory
The historically accepted idea that worry is often associated with anxiety and rumination
is often associated with depression is being challenged by recent literature. According to Moffit
et al. (2007), rumination is a significant mediator in the prospective associations of anxiety
symptoms with subsequent depression and of depressive symptoms with subsequent anxiety.
Further, abundant evidence documents strong temporal relationships between symptoms of
anxiety and depression and high levels of successive comorbidity between major depression and
anxiety disorders (Moffit et al., 2007). Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker and Larson (1994) suggest that
ruminative responses to negative affect are associated with elevated risk for the development of
comorbid symptoms of emotional disorders over time, thus explaining the role of rumination in
these reciprocal relations between symptoms of depression and anxiety over time. These
associations may result from the direct effects of rumination on positive and negative affect or
from the wide range of other negative consequences of rumination including poor problemsolving and decreased interpersonal functioning (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995;
Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Further, RNT increases vulnerability to multiple anxiety and
depressive disorders and, as a common risk factor, elevated RNT may account for the high levels
of comorbidity observed between emotional disorders (McEvoy et al., 2013; Starr & Davila,
2012). After controlling for depression and worry, Watkins (2009) revealed rumination is
positively associated with anxiety.
Thus, more recent research is moving in the direction where worry and rumination are
related to both anxiety and depression and there may not be clear delineations between the two
concepts in the development and maintenance of these disorders (Blagden & Craske, 1996;
Fresco et al., 2002; Molina et al., 1998; Muris, Roelofs, Meesters, & Boosmana, 2004; NolenHoeksems, 2000; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Siegle, Moore, & Thase, 2004; Starcevic, 1995;
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Watkins et al., 2005). For example, research points to evidence implicating RNT in a multitude
of disorders including a number of Anxiety and Mood disorders, thereby classifying RNT as a
transdiagnostic process (Harvey et al., 2004; Kalmbach et al., 2016; Kircanski et al., 2015;
Klemanski et al., 2016; McEvoy et al., 2013, Spinhoven, Drost, van Hemert, & Penninx, 2015).
Segerstrom et al. (2000) found that individuals prone to elevated levels of RNT, which includes
both worry and rumination, were more likely to experience anxiety and depression. Interestingly,
According to Ehring and Watkin’s (2008) review of the literature, RNT was found to be present
in non-control groups in up to thirteen disorders including: (a) Depression (e.g., Thomsen, 2006;
Watkins, 2008), (b) PTSD (e.g., Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Ehring, Ehlers, & Frank, 2008), (c)
Social anxiety disorder (e.g., Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006), (d)
OCD (e.g., Abramowitz, Whiteside, Kalsy, & Tolin, 2003; Amir, Cashman, & Foa, 1997), (e)
Insomnia (e.g. Harvey, 2002), (f) Eating disorders (e.g., Nolen–Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, &
Bohon, 2007; Sassaroli et al., 2005), (g) Pain disorder (e.g., Eccleston, Crombez, Aldrich, &
Stannard, 2001; Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995), (h) Hypochondriasis (Fink et al., 2004), (i)
Alcohol use disorder (Nolen–Hoeksema & Harrell, 2002; Nolen–Hoeksema et al., 2007), (j)
Psychosis (e.g., Freeman & Garety, 1999; Morrison & Wells, 2007), (k) Bipolar disorder (e.g.,
Thomas & Bentall, 2002; Thomas, Knowles, Tai, & Bentall, 2007), (l) GAD (Gentes & Ruscio,
2015), and (m) Panic disorder (McEvoy et al., 2013).
How Worry and Rumination leads to Psychopathology
Worry and rumination are behaviors that exist on a spectrum. These are behaviors all
people engage in to some degree, but an important question may be when and how these
processes become dysfunctional and are linked to the development and maintenance of
psychopathology. According to Ehring and Watkins (2008):
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One implicit assumption of the transdiagnostic approach is that a process is found in
multiple disorders because it reflects a normative process also found in healthy controls
(i.e., a continuum-dimensional approach to psychological disorders, with the same basic
processes and mechanisms active in both normal controls and patients, but in a more
extreme form in patients). (p. 200)
Since worrisome and ruminative thought processes can be found in clinical and nonclinical groups, many theories have been proposed in an attempt to explain what exactly moves
these processes from a functional realm to a dysfunctional one. Cognitive theorists posit that
RNTs are generated in response to unattained goals (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996). Since both
clinical and non-clinical individuals have personal concerns or goals that have not been
successfully met, it is believed that individuals who experience clinically significant symptoms
become “stuck” in excessive RNT because their goals may be more extreme, perfectionistic in
nature, and less attainable (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). Additional proposed theories to explain
excessive RNT include a tendency by some individuals to focus more on the self (internalizing)
at the expense of being aware of the environment and the cues it provides (externalizing)
(Ingram, 1990). Furthermore, some individuals have a propensity to favor abstract over concrete
processing (Watkins, 2008), which may lead to excessive RNTs and therefore a higher risk of
developing clinically significant symptomatology. While concrete processing generally results in
action plans with associated steps (who and what), thereby decreasing RNT and the associated
risk of developing RNT related psychopathology (Lyubomirsky et. al, 2013); individuals who are
more likely to utilize abstract processing frequently ask questions that may increase use of RNTs
to make sense of situations. Examples of such abstract processing questions include Why does
this always happen to me? And Why am I so unlucky? Versus concrete processing which
includes questions such as What steps am I going to take next to resolve this situation? Another
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theory for the maintenance of RNT is a strongly held belief that engaging in more RNTs will
lead to positive outcomes and goal attainment; when in fact it does not aid them in finding
effective solutions (Wells & Papageorgiou, 2004). As a result of those held beliefs, these
individuals continue the repetitive thought cycle constantly in search of a solution.
The additional question of whether RNT across the different disorders should be regarded
as one single process with identical phenomenological and functional properties cannot yet be
conclusively answered as the available empirical evidence on this issue is limited. However,
converging evidence from studies using different methodological approaches suggests that at
least the two most prototypical types of RNT; namely, worry and depressive rumination, show
many more similarities than clear differences. It therefore appears reasonable to adopt the
parsimonious hypothesis that worry and rumination share a strongly interrelated process with
several factors. In addition to being repetitive, difficult to control, and negative in content, this
process appears to also be characterized by a predominance of verbal stimuli, to adopt an abstract
quality, and to be possibly related to other negative cognitions. By using a trandiagnostic
approach to further examine worry and rumination, researchers may begin to isolate the
underlying factors of RNTs and develop specific interventions to reduce the use of RNTs overall
and bring their use to a more functional and normative state. This has implications on enhancing
the treatment of a variety of clinical disorders by targeting the underlying processes of
distressing symptoms.
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Chapter V: Method
Purpose of the Study
The proposed study will examine rumination and worry in the context of various
disorders, and will review a transdiagnostic treatment, Unified Protocol for Transdiagnostic
Treatment of Emotional Disorders, that addresses these constructs. The review will focus on
two types of repetitive negative thinking, worry and rumination, more specifically the (a)
definition, (b) process, (c) theories, and (d) maintenance of psychopathology. A second focus
of the analysis will be on the Unified Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional
Disorders (UP), more specifically the rationale for using a transdiagnostic treatment, an
overview of the UP treatment modules, a review of the UP literature, and implications for
future treatments. The literature will be synthesized and subsequently analyzed based on the
following, (a) authors, (b) types of therapies, (c) results, (d) discussion/conclusions and
clinical implications, and (e) critical appraisal and suggested future directions. The critical
appraisal component will include an emphasis on the research and interventions with UP and their
impact on reducing worry and rumination.
Literature Identification
Literature to be reviewed on worry, rumination, and UP, will be identified through
comprehensive searches of the following electronic EBSCOhost databases: PsycArticles,
PsychINFO, PubMed, ProQuest, PsychiatryOnline, and WorldCat, in addition to public
databases such as Google Scholar. The terms used to search the databases will include worry,
rumination, transdiagnostic, anxiety, depression, GAD, PTSD, OCD, SAD,
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treatment, UP, culture, and groups. The searches will involve using the library systems of Pepperdine
and Loyola Marymount Universities, as well as the Public Library system of Los Angeles, applying
the same terminology as noted above.
Presentation of Findings
The comprehensive review of the literature will be presented in prose and comprised
of separate chapters. The first chapter will elucidate the importance of worry and rumination in
the development and maintenance of psychopathology across various diagnosable disorders,
providing definitions and context for the constructs. The second chapter will include a detailed
exploration regarding the processes of rumination and worry in depression, GAD, PTSD, OCD,
and SAD. The third chapter will highlight the similarities and differences between worry and
rumination, especially as they are discussed in parallel often in the extant literature; and the
implications of these similarities and differences in developing explanatory mechanisms in
psychopathology and consequently treatments to address the associated clinical problems. The
fourth chapter will feature a limited discussion of culture and psychopathology. The final
chapter will focus on the rationale, overview, and literature associated with UP. Additionally,
the chapter will include ideas for future research.
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Chapter VI: Culture and Psychopathology
While it is beyond the scope of this document to comprehensively review the literature on
the manifestation of depressive and anxiety disorders across cultures, some examples of the
varied presentations of depression and anxiety may serve to remind clinicians of the importance
of considering and attuning to a patient’s culture while delivering any psychotherapeutic
intervention. Prior to considering the differences among various cultural manifestations of worry
and rumination concepts and dimensions, it is useful to begin with the consideration of a shared
transdiagnostic cross-cultural process that potentially underlies the development, maintenance,
and exacerbation of clinical symptoms across a spectrum of emotional disorders (e.g., GAD,
PTSD, OCD), known as “thinking a lot.” This concept, often discussed in the cross-cultural
literature and represents a possibly universal phenomenon, relates directly to the rationale of why
it may be beneficial to intervene from a unified approach rather than one that is targeted for
specific diagnoses.
Thinking a Lot a Cross-Cultural Similarity
Despite cultural differences in conceptualizations and operational definitions of worry
and rumination, more recent literature notes an important phenomenon of similarity; that
individuals from many cultures engage in repetitive negative thinking (RNT), that can include in
its conceptualization concepts related to worry and rumination (Hinton, Barlow, Reis, & de Jong,
2016). In cross-cultural literature, RNTs are referred as “thinking too much” or “thinking a lot,”
and regardless of the culture’s conceptualizations of how the mind and body function, or why
“thinking a lot” occurs, it seems accepted across cultures that engaging in excessive RNTs lead
to the development of stress (Hinton et al., 2016). Many researchers have identified “thinking a
lot” as a key communication of psychological distress; that is, when individuals complain of
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“thinking a lot,” they are communicating that they are repeatedly thinking (ruminating or
worrying) about past or future negative events to the point of creating psychological discomfort
(de Jong 2002; Hinton, et al., 2016; Kaiser et al. 2014; Pedersen, Kienzler, & Gamarra 2010;
Yarris, 2011, 2014). Hinton et al. (2016) defined “thinking a lot” as locally bound to “a specific
interpersonal, economic, and treatment course in a locality; ‘thinking a lot’ and its symptoms are
labeled, reacted to, and treated in a locality in a specific way that gives rise to a certain social,
economic, and treatment course” (Hinton, et al., 2016, p.575). Notably, “thinking a lot” is
identified as one of nine cultural concepts of distress in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Since individuals with different emotional disorders report excessive and
repetitive thinking about their current concerns, problems, past experiences, or worries about the
future, and because such RNT is found across diverse problems including affective disorders and
anxiety disorders, researchers have proposed RNT as a definite transdiagnostic process that leads
to psychopathology which may then be categorized into various DSM-5 diagnoses or culturebound syndromes (Hinton et al., 2016). RNTs may explain the observed shared variance in
emotional disorders across cultures, and may also serve as a rationale to turn our attention to
transdiagnostic perspectives in the development of effective treatments. However, there are
important cultural differences to consider in the manifestations of worry and ruminations as well,
which will weigh heavily into the tailoring of even unified treatment approaches for specific
individuals and their unique expressions of symptomatology. Some of the important cultural
differences found in extant literature are described in the subsequent section.
Cultural Differences
An evaluation of cultural differences in the presentation of various disorders requires that
a distinction be made between disease and illness. Diseases (e.g. hypertension, hypothyroidism)
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are biomedical and are present across cultures, whereas illnesses are culturally bound and
subjectively experienced (Stein & Williams, 2010). Essentially, a cultural group, race, or
ethnicity may be related to a given psychological phenomenon (Stein & William, 2010).
According to Hofmann & Hinton (2014), the subjective experience of the illness is influenced by
two main factors: 1) how individuals from different cultures understand the mind and body
connection, and 2) the impact that culturally specific social norms and rules have on both an
individual and the greater society. The first factor relates to the influence of individuals’
understanding of their own body on the individual expression of psychopathology (Hofmann &
Hinton, 2014). For example, the interpretation of symptoms of a panic attack may differ by
culture; while Americans may attribute the tightness in their chests to a heart attack, Cambodians
believe they are having a wind attack (Khayâl cap), which is described as a rising of wind and
blood in the body that can have deleterious effects (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
The second factor identified by the authors relates to the importance of contextual factors,
including social normal and group rules, in influencing the behavior of individuals. Some of the
well-researched, circumstantial factors include: (a) collectivistic vs. individualistic cultures and
(b) self-construals which is defined as the extent to which individuals view themselves as
independent vs. interdependent of others (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). For example, in
collectivistic cultures, the harmony between thoughts, feelings and behaviors is a primary focus
because of the higher societal calling on synchronization within the group. In many collectivistic
cultures, embarrassing other group member by not maintaining emotional harmony often is
associated with feelings of individual shame (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). Within the framework
of anxiety and depression this may lead to worry and rumination about embarrassing oneself and
others and feelings of shame (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). Alternatively, people’s thoughts and
feelings about themselves determine behavior in individualistic cultures generally leading to
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feelings of guilt and self-blame (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). Similarly, self-construals impact
the manifestation of psychopathology (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
In a sense, Hofmann & Hinton (2014) acknowledge that culture influences and affects the
content but not the process of psychopathology, such as depression and anxiety. The differences
seen between cultures are dependent on the beliefs individuals have about their emotional
experiences (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). Consequently, culture is of profound importance to the
experience of both depression and anxiety, the construction of meaning and social response to
illness within families and communities, the course and outcome of disorders, and thus to the
very constitution of emotional illness (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014).
Culture and depression. As outlined previously, much of the research on the function of
rumination carried out in psychology is undertaken on participants from western cultures and is
then generalized as a whole. Currently, the findings from research conducted in western cultures
overwhelmingly suggest that the role of rumination is associated with the maintenance of distress
and also with depression (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991;
Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Fredrickson, 1993; Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, Nolen-Hoeksema, &
Schouten, 2009). Importantly, however, research on the role of rumination in behavior and
psychopathology in western cultures does not necessarily transfer from one culture to another.
For example, Grossmann & Kross (2010) found that when Russians engage in rumination they
simultaneously create self-distance (i.e., seeing experiences as an outside observer).
Consequently, the impact of rumination is modulated downward (Grossmann & Kross, 2010).
Additionally, a study investigating rumination across various ages and cultures found that
rumination was lower in older Americans versus younger Americans (Grossmann, Karasawa,
Kan, & Kitayama, 2014). In contrast, rumination levels were found to be uniform and equal
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throughout the ages among Japanese participants (Grossman et al., 2010). These examples
highlight how cultural diversity manifests and impacts individual and group thoughts, behaviors,
and well-being.
Culture and anxiety disorders. As discussed extensively in a previous section, anxiety
disorders are some of the most prevalent mental disorders. However, these disorders are
strongly influenced by ethnic, racial, and cultural factors, in part because of culturally
dependent variations in the beliefs about the underlying physiology of the illness syndromes and
the social context and norms a person is exposed to (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). Cross-cultural
research provides a wealth of evidence suggesting that anxiety and disorders of anxiety are
universally present in human societies (Good & Kleinman, 1985). However, cross-cultural
exploration also demonstrates that the phenomenology of such disorders and the meaningful
forms through which distress is articulated varies in quite significant ways across cultures
(Good & Kleinman, 1985). Thus, since excessive, exaggerated worry is a symptom that has
been often associated with anxiety disorders, it is beneficial to explore how worry differs across
various cultures.
Cross-cultural research has identified three primary ways that the Western experience of
worry/anxiety differs from other cultures. First, according to Friedman (1997), Western cultures
tend to focus primarily on the emotional experiences of excessive worry to the exclusion of the
somatic presentations of worry. In many other cultures, worry is often characterized
somatically; for example, in some African cultures, worry and the manifesting feelings of
anxiety are experienced somatically as parasites crawling on the body and the head (Friedman,
1997). A second salient difference observed between cultures is the content of worries. For
example, in Western cultures, the content of worry in OCD is distressing and worrying is
viewed as a method to rid oneself of these thoughts (Clark, 2004; Fergus & Wu, 2010; McKay
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& Greisberg, 2002). In contrast, in some non-Western cultures, obsessions are believed to stem
from ancestral displeasure or intentional witchcraft leading individuals to believe that worry
functions to reduce the impact of the bewitchment or lessen ancestral anger (Stein & Williams,
2002). Third, the experience of worry has been found to differ across cultures as a function of
self-construal, specifically whether individuals view themselves as independent or
interdependent (Hofmann & Hinton, 2014). In Japanese and other Eastern cultures, Taijunkyofu-sho (TKS) is a disorder that shares many similarities with social anxiety disorder
(Hofmann & Hinton, 2014; Kirmayer, 1991) with a key difference of self-construal. As opposed
to Western cultures where worry is primarily focused on avoiding personal embarrassment
(independence), in Eastern cultures and in TKS individuals worry about embarrassing and
offending others (interdependence; Kleinknecht, Dinnel, Kleinknecht, Hiruma, & Harada, 1997;
Lewis-Fernandez et al., 2010; Hofman & Hinton, 2014). Thus, cross-cultural research on
emotional and somatic expressions of anxiety, the content of worry, and processes of selfconstrual provide strong evidence that a person’s cultural background influences the experience
and expression of emotions.
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Chapter VII: Unified Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders
Rationale for Transdiagnostic Therapies
As previously discussed, worry and rumination are RNTs that underlie a multitude of
emotional disorders, including mood and anxiety disorders (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, &
Shafran, 2004; Segerstrom, Hardy, Evans, Boggero, Alden, & Stanton, 2016; Segerstrom, Roach,
Evans, Schipper, & Darville, 2010; Watkins, 2008). Mood and anxiety disorders are often
referred to as emotional disorders because they are characterized by intense negative emotions
that are maintained by patients’ efforts to avoid or escape these aversive emotional experiences
(Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2014). Further, although using different
methodological approaches, studies directly comparing worry and rumination have revealed
more similarities than differences between these processes (Barlow et al., 2014), which may not
be surprising since emotional disorders are highly comorbid with each other (Kessler et al.,
2005). In a National comorbidity study, 12-month DSM-IV disorders were found to be highly
prevalent in the United States, with anxiety disorders ranked as the most common mental
disorder, followed by mood disorders (Kessler et al., 2005). Comorbidity profiles revealed more
than 57% of 12-month cases of anxiety and depression were comorbid, while lifetime prevalence
rates for comorbidity between anxiety and affective disorders were 81% (Brown, Campbell,
Lehman, Grisham & Mancill, 2001; Kessler et al., 2005). The high rate of comorbid disorders
among community populations (and not necessarily those that qualify for the strict
inclusion/exclusion criteria necessary to establish efficacy in clinical trials) suggests that
transdiagnostic treatments may better address the types of patients that present routinely in
clinical practice. Importantly, Transdiagnostic treatments allow for symptom reduction across the
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comorbid disorders, especially for those symptoms that have common underlying mechanisms
(such as worry and rumination) rather than targeting symptoms associated with a single disorder.
In addition to the aforementioned highly comorbid clinical presentations, it appears that
many emotional disorders share the likely universal process of RNTs (the terminology ascribed
to most Western literature) or “thinking a lot” (the terminology ascribed to most cross-cultural
studies; Hinton et al., 2016). Evidence from cross-cultural studies suggest that RNTs or
“thinking a lot may play a crucial role in the development and/or maintenance of psychological
disorders, combined with findings that display hardly any differences in process characteristics
of RNT/”thinking a lot” between anxiety and affective disorders, it is possible that the need for
disorder specific treatments will no longer be the gold standard. In their place, clinicians will be
called upon to learn and implement a parsimonious number of evidence-based treatments (Ellard,
Fairholme, Boisseau, Farchione, & Barlow, 2010) or techniques, with an aim towards unified
approaches or transdiagnostic protocols.
As discussed previously, transdiagnostic treatments address the likely universal process
of RNTs/”thinking a lot,” under which worry and rumination are subsumed. Furthermore,
transdiagnostic treatments address the potential self-report bias that may be especially prevalent
among certain cultures that are likely to ascribe self-stigma with regards to mental illness
diagnoses and identification by shifting the focus away from a categorical conceptualization of
psychopathology (which represents status as a “disordered individual”) to a dimensional one
(which suggests that mental health is based on establishing an optimal range for the expression
of a particular trait or characteristic). Therefore, the use of a transdiagnostic approach may help
to address the significant barrier that stigma can present for individuals who are in high need of
care but experience difficulty seeking and engaging in specialty mental health care. Instead of
focusing on symptom reduction or disorder “cures,” a transdiagnostic approach naturally lends
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itself to establishing and tracking other markers for progress such as quality of life and activities
of daily functioning improvement. Manuals can be developed around the concept of learning
skills to better one’s life, and to find the optimal dose of “thinking a lot” that helps the individual
strive towards and achieve goals but does not hold them back due to the engagement in excessive
ruminative content. Transdiagnostic approaches have the potential to shift the field’s traditional
focus on correcting dysfunction to improving function, in line with recent approaches that have
underscored the importance of positive psychology and the proliferation of strength-based
interventions.
Presently, many psychotherapeutic interventions focus on a single disorder and are
delivered through manualized, single-disorder protocols (SDP). Often times, the differences
between these protocols are minimal (Ellard et al., 2010; Wilamowska et al., 2010). The
limitations associated with this approach to therapy include the cost and time associated with
training clinicians to competently deliver disorder-specific manualized treatments, the
expectation that clinicians will achieve mastery of multiple treatment modalities, and the burden
on patients to access the appropriate treatment (Barlow et al., 2017; Norton & Roberge, 2017;
Wilamowska et al., 2010). Furthermore, the sheer number of manualized treatment protocols
make it challenging for clinicians to choose among them (Wilamowska et al., 2010). Thus, the
barriers associated with single-disorder treatments discussed above render the need for fresh
insight and new interventions in an effort to increase patient access to trained clinicians.
In response to these problems, transdiagnostic approaches to treatment emphasizing
commonalities across disorders have been attracting greater attention. A unified treatment
approach could increase clinician treatment mastery and address patient access to treatment,
while simultaneously treating co-morbid disorders (Barlow et al., 2017) Transdiagnostic
treatments are also more cost effective and time efficient (Bullis et al., 2015). Research focusing

44

on the efficacy of transdiagnostic treatment of psychopathology is a relatively recent
development in the field of psychology and advances in scientific research are leading to a more
dimensional (i.e., degree to which a characteristic or symptom is present) versus categorical
conceptualization of psychopathology (Ellard et al., 2010). When psychopathology is
conceptualized dimensionally, issues related to comorbidity, NOS diagnoses, and subclinical
presentations are substantially reduced, leading to a more direct approach to treatment planning
(Ellard, et al., 2010). One transdiagnostic treatment that has been garnering attention in the
recent literature is the Unified Protocol for the Trasdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional
Disorders (UP).
Overview of Unified Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders
The UP was developed to treat emotional disorders, including GAD, PTSD, OCD, SAD,
Panic Disorder, Agoraphobia, and mood disorders (Barlow et al., 2011). The UP was developed
utilizing research, information and data from the schools of neuroscience, learning theory,
emotional development, emotion regulation, and cognitive science (&, Allen & Choate, 2004,
Ellard et al., 2010). The literature suggests that emotional disorders, such as anxiety and
unipolar mood disorders (depressive disorders) share commonalities, including both biological
vulnerabilities (e.g., genetics) and psychological vulnerabilities (e.g., early life experiences)
(Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Brown, 2007; Brown & Barlow, 2009). Additionally,
investigations into mood and anxiety disorders have led to the identification of commonalities
across cognitive, behavioral, and emotion regulation domains (Ellard, et al., 2010). Thus, the UP
was designed to treat the underlying factors contributing and maintaining emotional disorders
rather than targeting disorder specific symptomology (Barlow et al., 2011; Gallagher et al.,
2013).
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In order to achieve this objective, the UP extracts various treatment components from
existing evidence-based treatment approaches to create a modules-based treatment for emotional
disorders (Gallagher et al., 2013). Primarily, the UP integrates the fundamental principles of
CBT, mindfulness, and acceptance based principles by, challenging maladaptive thoughts
(RNTs), by changing action urges associated with ineffective emotions, by targeting behavioral
and emotional avoidance, by focusing on the present moment, and by utilizing exposure
techniques (Barlow et al., 2011). Moreover, the UP incorporates interventions that focus on
deficits in emotion regulation since emotion dysregulation is an underlying feature of emotional
disorders (Barlow et al., 2011; Fairholme, Boisseau, Ellard, Ehrenreich, & Barlow, 2010).
Essentially, the focus of the UP is to counter emotion driven behaviors (EDBs), which
can interfere with patients’ lives. EDB is generally defined as acting on an internal urge that
generally will lead to trouble in the individual’s life. The UP focuses on how patients experience
and react to their own emotions rather than how they react to situational factors, such as feared
stimuli (e.g., public places, traveling by airplane; Barlow et al., 2017). Thus, the goal of the UP
is to teach patients new ways to respond to uncomfortable emotions, which in turn, impacts
individual behavioral choices and generally will result in a reduction of symptoms and
psychopathology (Norton & Paulus, 2016).
A profound departure from disorder-specific treatments of various emotional disorders,
the UP is designed to be applicable to all anxiety and unipolar mood disorders, as well as other
disorders with strong emotional components. The goals of treatment are accomplished through
eight modules: (a) Enhancing motivation (b) Psychoeducation regarding the function of
emotions (c) Mindful and nonjudgmental emotional awareness, (d) Cognitive flexibility, (e)
Identifying and preventing patterns of emotional avoidance, (f) Increasing awareness and
tolerance of emotion related sensations, (g) Interoceptive and situational emotion-focused
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exposures, and (h) Relapse prevention (Barlow, et al., 2017; Gallagher et al., 2013; Wilamowska
et al., 2010). Five of the eight modules (#3-7 on the list above) are considered to be core UP
modules, meaning that they deliver the core components of treatment (Barlow et al., 2011;
Wilamowska et al., 2010). With regards to delivering treatment, the modular design allows for
flexibility whereby modules can be tailored in length to meet the specific needs of patients
(Barlow et al., 2011; Wilamowska et al., 2010). The UP is designed to be delivered in 12-18
sessions for 50-60 minutes in length (Barlow et al., 2011). However, as mentioned previously,
the length of treatment may vary and the treatment allows for this variation based on the specific
patient’s presentation of distress (Barlow et al., 2011). The manualized sessions are allocated as
follows (Barlow 2011):
1. Module 1 - Motivation Enhancement for Treatment Engagement: 1 Session
2. Module 2 - Psychoeducation and Tracking of Emotional Experiences: 1-2
Sessions
3. Module 3 - Emotion Awareness Training: 1-2 Sessions
4. Module 4 - Cognitive Appraisal and Reappraisal: 1-2 Sessions
5. Module 5 - Emotion Avoidance and Emotion-Driven Behaviors (EDBs): 1-2
Sessions
6. Module 6 - Awareness and Tolerance of Physical Sensations: 1 Session
7. Module 7 -Interoceptive and Situation-Based Emotion Exposures: 4-6 Sessions
8. Module 8 - Relapse Prevention: 1 Session
The main principle across the five core modules is to help patients reduce reactivity to negative
emotions and increase emotional regulation skills. The main goals of each of the eight UP
modules are outlined below.
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Module 1: Motivation enhancement for treatment engagement. The first module,
motivational enhancement for treatment engagement, focuses on increasing commitment,
motivation and readiness for behavioral change (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne, Ellard, Farchione,
Fairholme, & Barlow, 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Many of the interventions in this module
are based on Motivational Interviewing (MI) and more specifically on research outlining the
adaptation of MI for anxiety and mood disorders (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et. al, 2014; Westra
& Dozois, 2002 & 2006; Wilamowska et al., 2010). MI is a counseling approach that was
developed by Miller and Rollnick (2002) in which patients are encouraged to engage in behavior
change through the exploration and resolution of ambivalence. There are three main goals
associated with this module: (a) facilitating the patient’s motivation to engage in treatment
through committed action (Barlow et al., 2011; Boswell, Bentley, & Barlow, 2015; Wilamowska
et al., 2010); (b) outlining the costs associated with not making behavioral changes (Barlow et
al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010); and (c) creating treatment goals which
are specific, personal, and achievable (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et
al., 2010). Although there is usually one session wholly dedicated to motivational enhancement,
clinicians are encouraged to refer back to the material in this module throughout treatment if and
when they notice waning motivation (Wilamowska et al., 2010).
Module 2: Psychoeducation and tracking of emotional experiences. The overarching
goal of this module is to work with patients in the service of fostering an understanding of the
function of emotions and to facilitate their awareness of when they are having emotional
experiences (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Similar to the
first module, Module 2 has three main goals. The first goal is to explain the function of emotions
and the ways in which positive and negative emotions are necessary, adaptive, and functional
(Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). The second goal is to
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educate patients on the three components of emotional experiences: (a) thoughts (i.e., what
people think, including RNTs); (b) behaviors (what people do); and (c) physiological responses
(how people physically feel; Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010).
The third goal is to present the concept of EDBs; chiefly, how they are often automatic and
adaptive in nature (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). For
example, patients may learn that when they feel fear, their automatic behavioral response is to
fight, flee or freeze which is adaptive in the face of true danger.
Module 3: Emotion awareness training. The third module is the first core module in
the UP and transitions the patient from motivation and psychoeducation to skill building. The
module focuses on taking a nonjudgmental approach toward one’s present focused emotional
experiences (Barlow et al., 2011; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Patients develop skills to observe
and describe their emotional experiences in the present moment (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et
al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). These skills allow patients to determine which thoughts,
behaviors, and physical sensations are contributing to their distress (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et
al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Even though the creators of this therapy (Barlow et al.,
2011) do not highlight the similarities between the skills taught in this module and the skills
taught in DBT, this module shares many concepts with emotion regulation strategies of observe,
describe, non-judgmentally, and one-mindfully employed in Dialectical Behavior Therapy
(Linehan, 1993).
Module 4: Cognitive appraisal and reappraisal. The ultimate goal of the fourth
module is to increase cognitive flexibility (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska
et al., 2010). Cognitive flexibility is the human ability to adapt cognitive processing strategies to
face new and unexpected conditions, both in one’s internal and external environments (Barlow et
al., 2011). Flexibility in thinking is achieved by (a) highlighting how appraisal of a situation
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impacts the response; (b) explaining the interrelationship between thoughts, behaviors, emotions,
and physiological responses; (c) identifying thinking patterns (maladaptive thinking traps); and
(d) reappraising maladaptive thoughts and generating alternative thoughts. It appears that the
interventions in this module draw from concepts and interventions found in Beckian CBT. More
specifically, patients are conceptualized as being in distress due to the way in which their
perception of a situation influences their mental, emotional, physical and behavioral reactions
(Beck, 1979). Moreover, research supports cognitive modification, or identifying dysfunctional
thoughts in order to make behavioral change, as being a central mechanism of change in CBT
(Lorenzo-Luaces, Keefe, & DeRubeis, 2016).
Module 5: Emotion avoidance and emotion driven behaviors (EDBs). The fifth
module (third core module) helps patients to alter set patterns of emotional responding by
gaining an understanding of how EDBs may maintain their distress (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne
et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). The goal of this module is to help patients identify and
counter behaviors that impede exposure to and processing of emotions, including behavioral
avoidance (e.g., procrastination and staying in bed), cognitive avoidance (e.g., rumination and
worry) and safety behaviors (e.g., rubbing a piece of fabric; Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al.,
2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Similarly, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)
identifies experiential avoidance as a process underlying different psychological disorders such
as anxiety and mood disorders through. ACT defines experiential avoidance as the deliberate
effort to avoid and/or escape from private events such as affects, thoughts, memories and bodily
sensations that are experienced as aversive (Hayes, 2004). Within the UP, EDBs can be
conceptualized as a form of experiential avoidance, and thus would function as a class of
behaviors that are negatively reinforced, thereby leading to the maintenance of the behavior(s)
associated with psychopathology.
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Module 6: Awareness and Tolerance of Physical Sensations. This module (fourth
core module) creates linkage for the patient between physical sensations and emotional
experiences (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). The main
intervention in this module is interoceptive exposure. Interoceptive exposure consists of a
multitude of experiential exercises that are designed to evoke the same physical sensations that
are experienced when a patient is anxious or distressed, with the goal of reducing a patient’s
conditioned emotional and behavioral response to the physical sensation (Barlow et al., 2011;
Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Interoceptive exposure is a technique commonly
used in CBT for anxiety disorders, and recent research indicates its efficacy in treating OCD
(Blakey & Abromowitz, 2018).
Module 7: Interoceptive and Situation-Based Emotion Exposures. The fifth and final
core module targets internal triggers (i.e., emotional and physical reactions) and external triggers
(i.e., environmental) (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). In this
module, in-vivo and imaginal exposure interventions are added to interoceptive exercises to
target physical reactions and emotional and behavioral avoidance, with the goal of increasing
tolerance of uncomfortable emotions and allowing new learning to occur (Barlow et al., 2011;
Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). These exposure techniques are used in therapies
such as prolonged exposure therapy for PTSD (Foa, 2011) and exposure and response prevention
for OCD (Franklin & Foa, 2011).
Module 8: Relapse Prevention. During the relapse prevention module, patient goals are
reviewed and reinforced and patient progress is discussed (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al.,
2014; Wilamowska et al., 2010). Patients are reminded through psychoeducation about the
vacillating nature of emotions, how to identify emotions and maladaptive behaviors, how to
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apply the skills learned in therapy in order to mitigate the chance of relapse, and how to respond
to relapse if and when it occurs (Barlow et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2014; Wilamowska et al.,
2010).
Unified Protocol, Worry and Rumination
UP potentially targets worry and rumination by counteracting experiential avoidance and
encouraging behavioral activation. UP hypothesizes it decreases worry and rumination through
its core modules, which contain elements of mindfulness and acceptance based therapies (e.g.,
DBT, ACT), cognitive therapies (e.g., CBT), and behavioral therapies (e.g., ERP). For example,
Module 3 focuses on increasing emotional awareness by utilizing mindfulness and acceptance
based approaches. Because the modules integrate multiple therapeutic approaches, the patients
learn skills that both target a range of unpleasant states and enhance their capacity to implement
present moment acceptance when they engage in the maladaptive processes of worry and
rumination, emotion dysregulation, intolerance of uncertainty, or over reliance on problem
solving. Further, Module 4 emphasizes cognitive restructuring, an intervention which may
alleviate some of the symptoms of worry and rumination, including increased cognitive
distortions, negative interpretations of the current moment, and negative outlook of the future.
Finally, the behavioral interventions utilized in Modules 5 through 7 target the process of fear
and the avoidance of emotional experiencing generated by excessive worry and rumination.
Thus, by working through the five core modules and by facilitating exposure and interoceptive
experiences, a patient learns mindful awareness of their emotional experiences, in addition to
identifying and preventing behavioral emotional avoidance. Consequently, the UP interventions
may reduce worry and rumination and subsequently impact symptom severity in anxiety and
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depressive disorders. However, further research would need to be undertaken to validate whether
the theory behind the development of UP can enact concrete and observable changes in thoughts
and behaviors.
Review of the Unified Protocol Literature
Extant research on the UP is relatively sparse and recent (within the last 7 years) with
only two open pilot trials and two randomized control trials (RCT). Although limited and further
validation with replication studies are needed, the data to date are encouraging. The trials, results
and limitations are outlined below.
Unified protocol trials. The first UP pilot trial was conducted by Ellard et al., (2010).
The investigators tested an early version of the UP in an open trial to determine patient
acquisition and implementation of the core skills and to receive feedback on the logical
progression of treatment. The sample consisted of 18 heterogeneous patients with a mean age of
30 years old, with diagnoses of MDD, dysthymia, GAD, PTSD, OCD, SAD and panic disorder
with agoraphobia (Ellard et al., 2010). At pretreatment, study participants had an average
number of diagnoses of 1.94. Patients were then administered extensive pre and post treatment
assessments to determine the impact of treatment on clinical diagnoses, symptom severity, and
daily functioning (Ellard et al., 2010). Following initial assessment, patients were seen for an
average of 13 treatment sessions by six doctoral students with 1-4 years of clinical experience
(Ellard et al., 2010). The results indicated that treatment with the UP led to a reduction in scores
from pre to post treatment on symptoms of anxiety and depression (Ellard et al., 2010). While
symptom reduction was evident post-treatment, symptom severity remained at a clinical level
(Ellard et al., 2010). Thus, the results indicated to researchers the need for further treatment
refinement (Ellard et al., 2010).
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Subsequent to the pilot study, the UP manual was revised to increase patients’ awareness,
specifically regarding the impact of their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in the present-moment
(Ellard et al., 2010). It was hypothesized that this revision would enhance patients’
understanding of their own emotional experiences, which would allow them to increase the
exploration of their dysfunctional emotional regulation strategies, and increase acquisition of
emotion regulation skills (Ellard et al., 2010). Once the UP protocol revision was complete, a
second pilot open-trial was conducted with a sample size of 15 participants, mean age of 29.73
years, who were each seen for approximately 17 sessions (Ellard et al., 2010). In contrast to the
first study, participants in this study evidenced a reduction of symptom severity to below
diagnostic thresholds whereby they no longer met criteria for their respective diagnoses (Ellard
et al., 2010). Of note, the results were sustained at 6-month follow-up (Ellard et al., 2010) and
comparable to diagnostic specific CBT protocols for anxiety and depression (Butler, Chapman,
Forman, Beck, 2006). Importantly, the results of the studies by Ellard et al. (2010) should be
interpreted with caution for a multitude of reasons, including the small sample sizes, a lack of
cultural diversity (Study 1: 94.4% Caucasian; Study 2: 80% Caucasian), no control groups,
recruitment from only one setting (a university center for anxiety and related disorders), and
open trials.
Further evaluation of the efficacy of the UP was demonstrated in an RCT comparing the
UP to a wait-list control/delayed treatment condition (Farchione et al., 2012). Participants were
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: (a) immediate UP treatment, in which they were
assessed pre and post treatment and at a 6-month follow-up period, or (b) the wait-list
control/delayed treatment condition, in which they were assessed at the beginning and end of the
16-week wait-list period and the end of treatment and at a 6-month follow-up (Farchione et al.,
2012). A total of 37 patients participated in the study, 94.2% Caucasian, with a mean age of
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29.32, and a maximum of 16 treatment sessions (Farchione et al., 2012). The participants had a
primary anxiety disorders diagnosis with comorbid diagnoses across both the anxiety and the
depressive disorders (Farchione et al., 2012). The UP treatment followed the same protocol
outlined in the second Ellard et al. (2010) study with the addition of motivational interviewing to
increase engagement in treatment (Farchione et al., 2012). Results showed clinically significant
reduction in symptoms across disorders and decreases in functional impairment were
demonstrated in patients in the UP treatment group in comparison to patients in the wait list
condition (Farchione et al., 2012). The improvements were maintained at 6-month follow-up,
lending further evidence for the UP treatment efficacy (Farchione et al., 2012). Similar to
previous studies, this study’s main limitations are its small sample size, lack of cultural diversity,
and participant recruitment from the same setting as the previous two studies. As a result,
generalizability is difficult. Also, in contrast to previous studies, this study included a wait-list
condition but not an active treatment comparison, thereby creating the possibility of confounding
variables (e.g., therapeutic alliance, creation of a safe space).
The most recent randomized controlled study for the UP treatment evaluated whether the
UP is as effective as specific disorder protocols (SPD) in the treatment of principle anxiety
disorders and comorbid disorders (Barlow et al., 2017). In this study, 233 patients were assigned
to the UP, an SDP, or a waitlist control condition (Barlow et al., 2017). Demographically, the
participants were 75.78% Caucasian, 7.62% Hispanic, 7.17% Asian. 6.73% African American,
and 2.69% Other, and averaged 31.10 years old. The study consisted of two phases: a maximum
16-week treatment/waitlist phase, and a 6-month follow-up phase (Barlow et al., 2017). To keep
the active treatment conditions consistent, the UP dosage was matched to SDP for each principal
diagnosis (Barlow et al., 2017). Results revealed equivalent outcomes between the UP and SDPs
at post-treatment and at 6 month follow-up for changes in symptom severity. Both protocols
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significantly improved the symptom severity of the participants in the study when compared to
the wait list control condition (Barlow et al., 2017). Remarkably, the UP condition evidenced
significantly less attrition than the SDPs condition. This may be due to the UP modules focus on
increasing motivation (Barlow et al., 2017). As in the previous three studies, the limitations
within the research continued to point toward limited cultural diversity, age, and recruitment of
participants from the same setting.
Further investigations. Building on the RCT by Farchione et al. (2012) and also using
data collected from the same participants, Bullis, Fortune, Farchione, and Barlow (2014)
examined the durability of effect of treatment during an extended follow-up period. As
mentioned, the sample consisted of some of the original participants in the Farchione et al.
(2012) study. Bullis et al. (2014) enrolled a total of 15 participants, 11 of whom were from the
original immediate treatment and 4 of whom were in the delayed treatment, with an average age
of 32.27 years, and 100% Caucasian. The results revealed that symptom reduction was
maintained at 18-month post-treatment across a range of anxiety and comorbid disorders,
although the effect size was larger at the 6-month follow-up than at the 18-month follow-up
(Bullis, et al., 2014). Notably, the results suggest no further gains in symptom reduction past the
6-month follow-up assessment (Bullis et al., 2014). Since this investigation was a follow-up
study to the Farchione et al. (2012) study, the limitations from the original study also impacted
the current study.
Another follow-up to the Farchione et al. (2012) study was conducted by Sauer-Zavala et
al. (2012), who sought to clarify the mechanism of change in the UP with regard to negative
emotions. Sauer-Zavala and her colleagues aimed to understand whether the mechanism of
change within the UP is due to a reduction in the frequency of negative emotional experiences,
or a change in patients’ relationship with and ability to tolerate negative emotions when they
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occur (Sauer-Zavala et al., 2012). Of note, there is support in the cross-sectional literature that
effective responding to negative emotions is more important for psychological health than the
frequency in the occurrence of the negative emotions (Sauer & Baer, 2009; Sauer-Zavala et al.,
2012; Segal Williams & Teasdale, 2002). While analyzing treatment outcomes, it was discovered
that participating in the UP resulted in a reduction in negative emotion reactivity (Sauer-Zavala
et al., 2012). More specifically, the data indicated an increase in acceptance and awareness of
emotions and a decrease in fear around emotions, as well as a decrease in anxiety sensitivity
(Sauer-Zavala et al., 2012). Of interest, a large effect size was found in the frequency of
participants’ report of negative emotions between pre and post treatment (Sauer-Zavala et al.,
2012). Therefore, the results indicate that treatment with the UP reduces both the frequency of
negative emotions and patients’ relationship and response to negative emotional states (SauerZavala et al., 2012). A possible explanation for the results is that effectively managing and
regulating emotions could lead to a decrease in frequency and intensity of negative emotions,
which in turn reduces cognitive and emotional avoidance, and the use of control strategies such
as worry and rumination (Sauer-Zavala et al., 2012).
Comparable to the two aforementioned follow-up studies of Farchione et al.’s (2012)
research, Gallagher et al., (2013) also investigated Farchione et al.’s (2012) data in order to
determine the effects of the UP on one’s quality of life. Quality of life is defined by the World
Health Organization (WHO) as an “individual’s perception of their position in life in the context
of the culture and value systems in which they live, and in relation to their goals, expectations,
standards, and concerns” (The WHOQOL Group, 1995, p. 1403). The results of this study
indicated that patients reported an overall increase in their day to day functioning (Gallagher et
al., 2013). Participants receiving the UP treatment (post treatment and post waitlist) experienced
significant improvements in quality of life, while also reporting a reduction in their anxiety and
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depressive symptomatology. Interestingly, the domain with the greatest improvement post
treatment was associated with self-esteem (Gallagher et al., 2013). The researchers hypothesized
that:
Based on conceptualizations of the motivational enhancement, emotional
awareness, and situational exposure modules of the UP as fostering development
of positive personal resources, such as self-esteem and self-efficacy, we have
hypothesized that these therapeutic strategies may exert specific effects on quality
of life. (Gallagher et al., 2013, p. 64)
At this point in time, the final study published based on the data collected by Farchione et
al. (2012) explored the effects of the UP on two dimensions of temperament, namely,
neuroticism/behavioral inhibition (N/BI) and extraversion/behavioral activation (E/BA) (Carl,
Gallagher, Sauer-Zavala, Bentley, & Barlow, 2014). The literature posits that high levels of
N/BI and low levels of E/BA contribute to the onset, development, overlap, and maintenance of
anxiety and mood disorders (Brown & Barlow, 2009). In this study, the post treatment in
comparison with the waitlist control group yielded data that reflected decreases in N/BI and
increases in E/BA, although the effect size was small and insignificant (Carl, et al., 2014).
Additionally, slight losses in E/BA gains were noted at 6-month follow-up (Carl, et al., 2014).
Conversely, more stable change was noted in N/BI from post-treatment to 6-month follow-up
(Carl, et al., 2014). As can be gleaned from the discussion above, despite an increasing interest
in the UP and the process of RNT in the clinical literature, research adopting a truly
transdiagnostic perspective on this topic is still sparse. It is important for future research to
determine which specific interventions within UP target worry and rumination. These
discoveries will lead to a further understanding of the etiology of various disorders and aide in
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the implementation of targeted interventions likely to ameliorate the symptoms causing the
greatest levels of distress.
Unified protocol group delivery. To date UP has primarily been studied in the context
of individual psychotherapy however more recently the protocol is being tested within group
formats to extend applicability. The benefits of delivering psychotherapeutic services in a group
format include scalability, time and cost efficiency, ability to practice skills by demonstrating
and teaching other group members, and interactions among participants that more closely
emulate the external environment (Bullis, Sauer-Zavala, Bentley, Thompson-Hollands, Carl &
Barlow, 2014), along with the clear benefits of peer support on promoting mental wellness,
common among all group-format interventions (Yalom & Leszcz, 2005). The current literature
includes one open trial pilot study on the effectiveness of delivering UP treatment in a group
format (Bullis et al., 2014). The patients (n = 11) completed pre- and post- treatment measures,
were randomly assigned to two groups and were then treated with 12, 2-hour weekly sessions of
the UP (Bullis et al., 2014). The participants were 90.9% Caucasian and averaged 44.55 years of
age. Although all 11 participants were diagnosed with an emotional disorder, eight out of the 11
were diagnosed with at least one additional emotional clinical diagnosis (Bullis et al., 2014).
The session structure followed a standard CBT based group format. Generally, a group agenda
included reviewing the previous session’s material, collaboratively reviewing the current
homework, introducing new material and exercises, and then concluding with next week’s
homework assignment (Bullis et al., 2014). The results of this study revealed a very strong
effect on anxiety symptoms, functional impairment, and experiential avoidance and a moderate
effect on depression symptoms, and life satisfaction (Bullis et al., 2014). Some of the limitations
associated with this study included a lack of randomization, no control conditions, no cultural
diversity, no follow-up assessment, and a small sample size.
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Although the results of the group delivery appear promising, there were challenges
associated with delivering the material in a group format. Firstly, patients who are highly fearful
of their emotions may need more direct and individualized intervention by a clinician than can
delivered in a group format (Bullis et al., 2014). Secondly, patients may acquire skills at
varying rates making it challenging for the clinician to determine the speed with which to present
the material (Bullis et al., 2014). Further studies may help to tease out which types of individuals
may be best served by group interventions and help determine optimized speeds of presentation
to ensure learning across individuals with varying needs.
Cross-Cultural literature. In reviewing the recent literature on cross-cultural
implementation of the UP, to date there exists only one research study on the efficacy of the UP
for anxiety and depressive disorders in non-Western populations. This study was an open trial
pilot study that examined the outcomes associated with implementing the UP with a Japanese
clinical population (Ito, Horikoshi, Kato, Oe, 2016). Seventeen participants with a mean age of
35.18 completed approximately 18 sessions of treatment (Ito et al., 2016). In order to maintain
fidelity, the content of material remained consistent and the implementation remained the same
as when used in the West, with the exception of translating the therapist manual and the patient
workbook into Japanese. Illustrations to the patient workbook were also added in order to assist
with the comprehension of certain concepts (Ito et al., 2016). The results showed a significant
decrease in anxiety and depressive symptoms, improved functioning, and enhanced quality of
life both post-treatment and at three-month follow-up (Ito et al., 2016). This suggests that the UP
may be applicable for use in non-Western countries and for emotional disorders (Ito et al., 2016).
With regards to limitations to the study, it shares many of the same limitations as in the Ellard et
al. (2010) studies. For example, the study is a pilot study rather than a randomized control trial
(RCT) and has a very small sample size (n = 17), thereby producing a small effect size (Ito et al.,
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2016). Nevertheless, this study’s findings form the basis for future RCT with larger sample sizes
to ensure the stability of treatment effects cross-culturally. Future studies will help enhance our
knowledge of what modules of UP may work best for different cultural groups, and what
modifications, if any, might be helpful to undertake in cross-cultural applications to ensure
cultural congruence and improve symptom reduction.
Recommendations for Future Research
Upon reviewing the existing body of literature on the UP, areas for future focus and next
steps for research have become apparent. Since the extant research is sparse, it will be important
to conduct more RCTs with larger sample sizes in order to draw more comprehensive
conclusions and to generate more confidence in the treatment effects that are found. In addition
to increasing sample size, participant demographics need to be expanded to include greater age
ranges and representation of diverse cultures to ensure generalizability of the findings. Moreover,
future studies will need to consider adaptations of the UP to fit the different cultural backgrounds
of patients. In addition to representing cultural backgrounds, future research will need to expand
its recruitment pool for study participants. To date, research on the UP has been implemented in
a single setting: university centers for anxiety and related disorders. Expanding the settings to
include community mental health centers, private practices, veterans administrations, and
primary care clinics are indicated. Another avenue for empirical exploration of the UP might be
associated with treatment modalities. Most of the existing studies focus primarily on the efficacy
of individual therapy. An area of further study might include expanding delivery to groups,
telemental health delivery, and internet-based therapy. With regards to study participants, the
majority of subjects in the reviewed studies had primary diagnoses of anxiety disorders with
comorbid mood disorders; therefore, participants with primary mood disorders with comorbid
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anxiety disorders should be included in future research to examine if the studies will yield
similar results. Since worry and rumination are transdiagnostic and are implicated in anxiety and
mood disorders, there is a need to study, in a more focused and specific manner, the impact of
the UP on RNTs. However, because the majority of the abovementioned studies only examined
general measures of anxiety, the impact on specific mechanisms and outcomes that characterize
different fears (e.g., fears of social situations, or fears of physical sensations) still remains
unclear. It will be important for future investigations of the UP to address questions regarding the
performance of the UP outside of a research setting, the acceptability of a transdiagnositic
treatment conceptualization among non research mental health providers, and the utility and
feasibility of integrating the UP into our mental health care system
Conclusion
Overall, a transdiagnostic treatment approach seems positive. Analysis of the results
across all studies that reported baseline and post-treatment data showed that the UP leads to large
and significant reductions in both anxiety and depression, and moderate improvements in quality
of life. Results at short-term follow-up (three to six months after treatment) also suggest that
these positive outcomes are maintained following treatment. In addition to positive treatment
outcomes, it must not be overlooked that a transdiagnostic protocol is also time and cost saving.
Transdiagnostic treatments do not require detailed patient assessments and conceptualizations
since the clinician is providing one treatment for a range of condition. The important theory that
underlies UP, namely, that a structured intervention can be applied across diagnoses to address
common underlying etiology that produces the overt symptoms of an illness; is a highly exciting
development in the therapeutic literature and has significant impact for the ongoing fight to
reduce stigma related to mental illness in general, as well as the self-stigma that certain specific
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diagnostic labels can impose on the mentally ill that leads them to turn away from evidencebased services that can aid them to live a meaningful and productive life. The future of UP and
its multitudes of applications should be a priority for upcoming research investigations, and if
supported by federal and private funding sources, may help this approach to be utilized more
systematically across settings and with individuals with seemingly very different presentations,
but who may all ultimately benefit from the techniques of UP.
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Dear Colleague,
Please find enclosed a copy of the Ruminative Responses Scale we have been using in
much of our research on response styles for depression. For full information on the
psychometric qualities of this scale, please see Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003),
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 247-259. To obtain scores on this scale, simply sum the
scores on the 22 items.
I am often asked about cut-offs for determining whether an individual is a “ruminator” or
not. We have not established any cut-offs; instead, I believe the appropriate use of this
questionnaire is as a continuous measure. If you wish to select groups of “high” or “low”
ruminators, I recommend using percentile cut-offs from your own sample (e.g., selecting people
who score in the top 33% of your sample as “high” ruminators and people who score in the
bottom 33% as “low” ruminators).
The original Response Styles Questionnaire also included Distraction and ProblemSolving subscales. Neither of these subscales has proven reliable or good predictors of
depression change over time, so I am no longer distributing them.
Please send me copies of reports of all studies in which you use any of these scales.
Good luck in your research.
Sincerely,
Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Ph.D.
Yale University
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Rumination Scale
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of the
items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost always think
or do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally
do, not what you think you should do.
1 almost never

2 sometimes

3 often

4 almost always

1. think about how alone you feel
2. think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this”
3. think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness
4. think about how hard it is to concentrate
5. think “What am I doing to deserve this?”
6. think about how passive and unmotivated you feel.
7. analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed
8. think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore
9. think “Why can’t I get going?”
10. think “Why do I always react this way?”
11. go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way
12. write down what you are thinking about and analyze it
13. think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better
14. think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.”
15. think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”
16. think “Why can’t I handle things better?”
17. think about how sad you feel.
18. think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes
19. think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything
20. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed
21. go someplace alone to think about your feelings
22. think about how angry you are with yourself
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Patient Name:

Date:

The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ)
Instructions: Rate each of the following statements on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of
me”) to 5 (“very typical of me”). Please do not leave any items blank.
Not at all
typical of
me

Very
typical
of me

1.

If I do not have enough time to do
everything, I do not worry about it.

1

2

3

4

5

2.

My worries overwhelm me.

1

2

3

4

5

3.

I do not tend to worry about things.

1

2

3

4

5

4.

Many situations make me worry.

1

2

3

4

5

5.

I know I should not worry about
things, but I just cannot help it.

1

2

3

4

5

6.

When I am under pressure I worry a lot.

1

2

3

4

5

7.

I am always worrying about something.

1

2

3

4

5

8.

I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts.

1

2

3

4

5

9.

As soon as I finish one task, I start to
worry about everything else I have to
do.

1

2

3

4

5

10. I never worry about anything.

1

2

3

4

5

11. When there is nothing more I can do
about a concern, I do not worry about it
anymore.

1

2

3

4

5

12. I have been a worrier all my life.

1

2

3

4

5

13. I notice that I have been worrying
about things.

1

2

3

4

5

14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop.

1

2

3

4

5

15. I worry all the time.

1

2

3

4

5

16. I worry about projects until they are all done.

1

2

3

4

5
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Scoring the PSWQ
In scoring the PSWQ, a value of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 is assigned to a response depending upon
whether the item is worded positively or negatively. The total score of the scale ranges from 16
to 80.
Items 1, 3, 8, 10, 11 are reverse scored as follows:
• Very typical of me = 1 (circled 5 on the sheet)
• Circled 4 on the sheet = 2
• Circled 3 on the sheet = 3
• Circled 2 on the sheet = 4
• Not at all typical of me = 5 (circled 1 on the sheet)
For items 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 the scoring is:
• Not at all typical of me = 1
• Ratings of 2, 3, and 4 are not transformed
• Very typical of me = 5

Citation: Meyer TJ, Miller ML, Metzger RL, Borkovec TD: Development and Validation of
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy 28:487495,1990
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Graduate & Professional Schools Institutional Review Board
July 25, 2017
Katya Naman
Project Title: Worry and Rumination: A Transdiagnostic Approach to Treatment
Re: Research Study Not Subject to IRB Review
Dear Ms. Naman:
Thank you for submitting your application, Worry and Rumination: A Transdiagnostic Approach
to Treatment, to Pepperdine University’s Graduate and Professional Schools Institutional Review
Board (GPS IRB). After thorough review of your documents you have submitted, the GPS IRB
has determined that your research is not subject to review because as you stated in your
application your dissertation research study is a “critical review of the literature” and does not
involve interaction with human subjects. If your dissertation research study is modified and thus
involves interactions with human subjects it is at that time you will be required to submit an IRB
application.
Should you have additional questions, please contact the Kevin Collins Manager of Institutional
Review Board (IRB) at 310-568-2305 or via email at kevin.collins@pepperdine.edu or Dr. Judy
Ho, Faculty Chair of GPS IRB at gpsirb@pepperdine.edu. On behalf of the GPS IRB, I wish you
continued success in this scholarly pursuit.
Sincerely,

Kevin Collins
Manager, Graduate and Professional Schools (GPS) Institutional Review Board
cc:

Dr. Lee Kats, Vice Provost for Research and Strategic Initiatives
Mr. Brett Leach, Compliance Attorney
Judy Ho, Faculty Advisor

